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Despite pressures to increase performance and decrease costs, innovation has been slow to emerge in the
municipal wastewater sector. The relationship between regulation and innovation in this sector is a particularly
interesting aspect of this conundrum, given the degree to which public utility decision-making is influenced by
regulation. Using a national survey, this paper examines US wastewater utility managers’ perceptions of how
regulation influences the adoption of new technologies. Recognizing that the relationship between innovation
and regulation is complex, we develop the concept of regulation as multifaceted and examine three interrelated
aspects of regulation: (1) regulatory requirements, (2) regulators and relationships, and (3) the broader regu
latory environment. Specifically, we seek to understand whether and in what ways wastewater utility managers
perceive these aspects of regulation as hindering or encouraging the adoption of new technologies. We find that,
although stringent effluent limitations are perceived to be a moderate barrier to innovation, most survey re
spondents did not identify weakening them as a way to encourage innovation. Instead, respondents generally
identified factors related to regulatory relationships and factors related to the broader regulatory environment as
barriers to innovation, and indicated that addressing these aspects of regulation would encourage innovation. We
conclude that loosening or tightening regulatory requirements is not the most effective way to promote inno
vation in the municipal wastewater sector. Rather, those parties with an interest in innovation can focus on
helping utilities and regulators build relationships and better navigate the processes that influence decisions
about new technologies.

1. Introduction

slow (Ajami et al., 2014). This “crisis of innovation” (Thomas and Ford,
2005) is particularly concerning given that key pieces of US environ
mental law, including the 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA) and its associ
ated regulations, were intended to encourage the adoption of new
technologies as a means toward the goal of improved environmental
quality (Eisner, 2007; Gerard and Lave, 2005).
In light of this need for the development and adoption of new tech
nologies in the wastewater sector, it is important to develop a better
understanding of the barriers that impede innovation. Previous research
on innovation in urban wastewater utilities suggests that utility man
agers identify regulatory compliance as one of several significant bar
riers to innovation, alongside cost/financing and risk aversion among
utility decision-makers (Kiparsky et al., 2016). However, details of the
relationship between regulation and innovation in the wastewater sector

Growing urban populations, aging infrastructure, and increasing
pressure on government budgets at all levels are straining the capacity of
urban wastewater treatment systems in the United States (ASCE, 2017;
GAO, 2019; Hering et al., 2013; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 2014), and this
strain is exacerbated by expectations of improvements in water quality
and environmental stewardship (Daigger, 2009; Reeves and Littlehat,
2011; Vidal-Dorsch et al., 2012). To address these challenges, the
municipal wastewater sector will need to innovate in the coming years
(Carter et al., 2017; Kiparsky et al., 2013; Sedlak, 2014). While inno
vation in other sectors, including computing, energy, and biotech
nology, has dramatically accelerated during the last two decades
(Schwab, 2017), technological change in the wastewater sector has been
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remain underexplored.
In the United States, 98% of sewage treatment facilities are publicly
owned (EPA, 2002), with the operation of these facilities regulated by
state and federal agencies. While an extensive literature evaluates
environmental regulation’s impacts on private sector innovation (e.g.,
Ambec et al., 2013; Dechezlepr^
etre and Sato, 2017; Driesen, 2003; Jaffe
and Palmer, 1997), the municipal wastewater sector is distinct in that it
is not characterized by strong market incentives (Brubaker, 2002; Wolf,
1979). Instead, a lack of innovation in the sector may be explained by
price signals muted through the public utility governance structure, as
well as missing incentives for environmental performance that exceed
the minimum needed to achieve compliance. Regulation may address
these shortcoming in the non-market context through carefully struc
tured policies (Wolf, 1979), or it may exacerbate such failures by fa
voring incumbent technologies (Stewart, 1981).
In this paper, we focus on understanding the interactions between
regulation and innovation in the municipal wastewater sector through a
survey of wastewater utility managers. We define innovation in terms of
technology diffusion, while acknowledging that other forms of innova
tion, such as new management practices, are also important in the
sector. Recognizing that technology diffusion can be considered an ag
gregation of individual choices about technology adoption (Sunding and
Zilberman, 2001), we examine utility managers’ perceptions of how
regulation affects decisions about the adoption of new technologies.
To capture the variety of ways in which regulation can influence
innovation in the wastewater sector, we consider regulation not as a
singular construct, but rather as a complex and multifaceted one that
encompasses three major aspects: regulatory requirements, regulators
and relationships, and the broader regulatory environment. Our analysis
compares utility managers’ perspectives on regulation and innovation
within and across these different aspects of regulation. This multifaceted
framing contributes a deeper and more specific understanding of how
utility managers perceive regulation as a barrier to innovation, and ways
that regulation might better encourage it. We find that the regulatory
barriers and potential solutions identified by wastewater utility man
agers tend to emphasize the relational aspects of regulation and the
regulatory environment, and that utility managers place less emphasis
on specific regulatory requirements.

on facility changes, regulatory efforts to meet water quality standards
when receiving waters are impaired, changes to state-designated bene
ficial uses of receiving waters, changes to effluent limitations related to
beneficial uses, and other factors. Most interactions between wastewater
utilities and CWA regulators are likely to occur during the NPDES
permitting process and, if violations occur, in the context of enforcement
actions (see Supplemental Information A for more detailed information
on POTW regulation under the NPDES program).
To complement the requirements it imposed, the CWA initially
provided significant federal funding for POTW construction and
improvement, which contributed to the widespread adoption of sec
ondary treatment processes in the United States (EPA, 2000). However,
amendments to the CWA in 1987 greatly reduced the amount of federal
funding allocated to POTW construction and capital improvement pro
jects (CBO, 2002). Although limited federal funds are still available, the
financial burden has largely shifted to states and local governments,
which have since struggled to meet their capital investment needs (Adler
et al., 1993; EPA, 2016). In addition, the 1987 CWA amendments
effectively ended EPA’s Innovative and Alternative Wastewater Treat
ment Technology program (Environmental Law Institute, 1998).1 This
program provided a higher percentage of federal funding for projects
employing innovative technologies, guaranteed federal funds for
modification or replacement in the event of a failed innovative tech
nology, and included an aggressive technology transfer program to
disseminate information about funded projects (EPA, 1989). The
termination of this program may contribute to the slow pace of inno
vation in the sector.
2.2. Innovation, regulation, and wastewater treatment technologies
Broadly, the CWA is considered to be a technology-forcing statute
(Eisner, 2007) intended to “generate the technology needed to achieve
acceptable levels of water quality” (Glicksman et al., 2010). Despite the
technology-forcing intent and the effectiveness of the CWA in spurring
the adoption of secondary treatment in the United States, the relation
ship between regulation and the diffusion of new technologies in the
municipal wastewater sector remains unclear.
Secondary treatment using activated sludge is a technology that has
remained largely unchanged in the last 100 years and is still widely used
in POTWs (Sheik et al., 2014). Literature on the sustainability of
wastewater technologies has emphasized the relative limitations of
activated sludge with respect to emissions reductions, resource recov
ery, and other sustainability criteria (Heidrich et al., 2011; Muga and
Mihelcic, 2008). In addition, there are increasing concerns about
disinfection byproducts, endocrine disrupting chemicals, and nutrient
pollution that are not adequately addressed by the most commonly used
clean water technologies (Sedlak, 2014). With regard to nutrient
pollution in particular, there are over 150 thousand miles of rivers and
nearly 5 million acres of lakes and reservoirs that are considered to be
impaired in the United States (EPA, 2011). Addressing these and other
emerging issues will require innovation in the wastewater sector
(Kiparsky et al., 2013).
In this paper, we recognize wastewater innovation as the use of new
and alternative technologies and processes, or the use of existing ap
proaches in contexts where they are not well established (e.g., Envi
ronmental Law Institute, 1998). Innovation is thus the combination of
an invention that results in a new technology, plus the diffusion of that
technology into markets and practice. In this sector, innovations include

2. Regulation and innovation in the municipal wastewater
sector
2.1. Wastewater utility regulation under the Clean Water Act
Since 1972, discharges from U.S. wastewater utilities have been
regulated under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C. xx
1251–1388). The CWA requires that all point sources discharging pol
lutants to waters of the United States do so only in compliance with a
permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). Municipal wastewater treatment facilities, which the CWA
refers to as publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), often discharge
treated effluent to rivers, lakes, or other waters of the United States.
NPDES permits for these discharges contain a number of elements,
including effluent limitations, monitoring and reporting requirements,
and other standard or site-specific terms and conditions intended to
protect water quality and ensure compliance. NPDES permits usually
include two types of effluent limitations for POTWs: generally applicable
“technology-based” limits and additional site-specific “water qual
ity-based” limits (EPA, 2010). Technology-based effluent limitations for
POTWs around the nation are grounded in the pollutant reductions
achievable through secondary treatment processes or equivalent. These
technology-based effluent limitations have remained unchanged since
1984, but water quality-based effluent limitations may be more varying
and more stringent. NPDES permits are issued for up to 5 years and
utilities must reapply at least 180 days before their existing permit ex
pires. Permit requirements are likely to change with each renewal based

1
The Innovative and Alternative Wastewater Treatment program distin
guishes between “innovative” and “alternative” technologies, however we do
not make a distinction in this paper. According to EPA (1989), innovative
technologies are those that have not been fully-proven for the intended appli
cation and alternative technologies as those that contribute to cost savings
through resource recovery.

2

L. Sherman et al.

Journal of Environmental Management 260 (2020) 110025

the use of alternative disinfectants, such as ultraviolet light and ozone,
as well as various biological nutrient removal processes (Hu et al., 2012;
Mezzanotte et al., 2007). Innovation may also include monitoring,
software, and information technologies that have the potential to
improve operations and efficiency of POTWs (Eggimann et al., 2017) or
refer to the increased use of decentralized systems as an emerging
paradigm shift for traditionally centralized treatment (Massoud et al.,
2009; Sedlak, 2014; van Loosdrecht and Brdjanovic, 2014). Finally,
innovative technologies include the use of advanced tertiary treatment
techniques, such as reverse osmosis and membrane bioreactors that
often accompany water recycling and reuse (Fane et al., 2011).
While the CWA may encourage the diffusion of these technologies,
studies examining innovation in the wastewater sector have pointed to
regulation as a barrier to the adoption of new technologies (Ajami et al.,
2014; Kiparsky et al., 2016). Data from Kiparsky et al. (2016) suggest
that wastewater utility managers perceive regulation as a barrier to
innovation, but that these managers have diverse perceptions of exactly
how regulation affects their ability to innovate. In their discussion of
barriers to innovation in the water and wastewater sectors, Ajami et al.
(2014) describe several barriers related to regulation, including costs
associated with prolonged regulatory approval, the fragmentation be
tween different regulatory agencies, and the need for more flexible
regulatory instruments. However, both of these studies address regula
tion as one of a broader suite of barriers to innovation, and neither fo
cuses specifically on the complex ways in which regulation may interact
with technology diffusion.

Pontoglio, 2011).
Policy instruments can generally be divided into three categories: (1)
means standards2 or technology specifications (often critiqued as de
terring innovation through a lack of flexibility); (2) performance stan
dards (generally thought to better encourage innovation via flexibility);
and (3) market- or incentive-based programs (conventionally considered
to be the most effective instrument for encouraging innovation)
(Coglianese and Nash, 2017; Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Kemp, 1997;
Stewart, 1981). However, performance standards based on a particular
technology, such as effluent limitations for POTWs based on secondary
treatment, may discourage innovation by incentivizing adoption of the
incumbent technology underlying the performance standard (Andreen,
2004; Stewart, 1981). Other characteristics of regulation may deter
innovation as well, including cumbersome administrative processes,
lengthy permitting times, and lack of regulatory agency resources for
updating standards (Eisner, 2007; Fiorino, 2006; Ulibarri et al., 2017).
A number of empirical studies have attempted to examine the rela
tionship between regulation and innovation, though most have focused
on a private-sector context (Dechezlepr^etre and Sato, 2017; Jaffe and
Palmer, 1997; Rubashkina et al., 2015). While these studies have found
that indeed, regulation has a positive impact on technology diffusion
(del Río Gonz�
alez, 2009; Horbach, 2015), they often focus primarily on
regulatory stringency (for example, by relying on a proxy variable such
as pollution abatement costs to represent the stringency of regulation)
(Dechezlepr^etre and Sato, 2017). However, the focus on regulatory
stringency provides a limited understanding of the multifaceted nature
of regulation (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). Recognizing this limitation,
scholars have called for more research examining how various other
�lez,
aspects of environmental regulation affect innovation (del Río Gonza
2009; Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011; Rennings, 2000).

3. The mixed relationship between regulation and innovation
3.1. Innovation and regulation in the public sector
While most scholarship on the relationship between innovation and
regulation has focused on private firms, public utilities have distinct
characteristics that impact the innovation-regulation dynamic (e.g.,
Brubaker, 2002; Markard and Truffer, 2006). In concept, a new envi
ronmental control technology may be desirable to a public utility if it
abates pollution at lower cost, improves environmental outcomes, or
both. Private firms under competition would be expected to seek out
these innovations when regulation requires them to internalize envi
ronmental costs (Driesen, 2003). Public sector utilities, in the absence of
competition and market incentives, may under- or over-invest in new
technologies (Wolf, 1979). Public utility managers may, for example,
identify with a mission-driven or ethical purpose (Dixit, 2002), leading
them to explore the use of socially or environmentally beneficial tech
nologies even in the absence of regulation. Utility managers may also
have incentives to avoid innovation, especially to the extent that new
technologies carry risk of failure, Managers may be uniquely subject to
public exposure, and may prefer to avoid bringing additional visibility to
their operations (Rayner et al., 2005). In general, public sector utilities
have been characterized as more risk-averse and more inclined to adopt
conventional technologies than private sector actors (Rayner et al.,
2005; Wagner and Fain, 2018).
Regulation has the potential to push risk-averse decision-makers to
consider or adopt new technologies, thereby overcoming their riskaverse behavior (Ambec et al., 2013). However, numerous variables
can influence the degree to which regulation encourages or discourages
innovation. These include the stringency of regulations, the character
istics of regulatory tools, the degree of uncertainty about future regu
latory standards, and even the “style of regulation” (Bernauer et al.,
�lez, 2009; Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Stewart,
2007; del Río Gonza
1981). Scholars have also noted that regulation should be sufficiently
flexible, minimize uncertainty, and be designed to foster continuous
improvement (Ambec et al., 2013; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). In
particular, this research has emphasized the importance of stringency
and the incentives for innovation that relate to the chosen policy in
strument (Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Kemp et al., 2000; Kemp and

3.2. The many facets of utility regulation
To facilitate a more detailed understanding of the relationships be
tween regulation and innovation, we conceptualize regulation as a
process with three main aspects: regulatory requirements, regulators
and relationships, and the broader regulatory environment (Table 1).
First, regulation involves a number of substantive and procedural
regulatory requirements. These requirements include any environmental
performance standards, technology requirements, incentive-based reg
ulatory programs, or other process-based mandates, as well as related
measures to ensure compliance. In the wastewater sector, this primarily
consists of the regulation of discharge through a combination of
technology-based specifications and environmentally-based perfor
mance standards, as well as related monitoring and reporting
requirements.
A second and underemphasized aspect of regulation centers on reg
ulators and relationships (Willman et al., 2003), the quality and tenor of
which can play a significant role in encouraging or discouraging inno
vation. Public sector actors, in particular, may have narrow priorities
that limit the attention given to innovation, but the process of collabo
rating with other actors may help broaden their view (Sørensen and
Torfing, 2011). In this way, regulation can be considered more than just
a set of rules; it also involves communication and discourse between
regulators and the regulated community (Black, 2002). In the waste
water sector, these relationships primarily involve utility managers and
wastewater regulators, but may also include other relevant parties.
Finally, it is important to recognize that regulation does not originate
or operate in a vacuum. Instead it is embedded within a broader regu
latory environment, sometimes referred to as “inter-institutional” and/or
2
We prefer to use the term “means standard” in lieu of “command and
control” although the latter is frequently used. As noted by Coglianese and Nash
(2017) the term “command and control” often expresses an implicit policy in
strument preference.
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comments. Respondents were first asked about their experience with a
variety of innovative treatment technologies and processes so as to
evaluate their understanding of the various technologies that may be
available. Respondents were then asked about their perceptions of a
variety of potential regulatory barriers to the adoption of new technol
ogy, as well as the extent to which different potential solutions might
encourage the adoption of new technology. Respondents were addi
tionally asked to provide basic information about their utility.
Survey respondents were recruited in several ways. First, we part
nered with national industry associations including the National Asso
ciation of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA), the Water Research
Foundation (WRF), and the Water Environment Federation (WEF); and
state-level industry associations including the California Association of
Sanitation Agencies (CASA) and state and regional chapters of the Water
Environment Association (WEA). Leaders of these professional organi
zations assisted in piloting the survey and provided feedback on survey
design, then distributed the surveys to their members via their email
lists. Second, we distributed the survey via email to POTWs with listed
email addresses in the public Integrated Compliance Information System
for NPDES permits (ICIS-NPDES). Third, we mailed postcards with a
shortened survey link to POTWs holding major NPDES permits, using
the addresses listed in the ICIS-NPDES database. Email is an optional
field in the database, but a physical address is a required field. In
addition, we followed up with a phone call campaign to target utilities
that did not respond to our email outreach efforts. Table 2 summarizes
the estimated population and response rate from each of these survey
distribution methods. Response rates varied widely by distribution
method, with surveys targeting professional organization members
receiving a much higher response rate; this variation is congruous with
reviews of survey response rates (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). We
encouraged recipients of our emails to forward the survey link to others,
so it is impossible to know exactly how many people were contacted via
email, and the response rates presented Table 2 should be considered
estimates.
We received responses from 42 states across all 10 EPA regions
(Fig. 1). While our survey has national coverage, limited data in some
regions prevents us from resolving regional differences (e.g., Region 2;
see Supplemental Information C).
While we acknowledge that our overall response rate is low, we
received an adequate response rate from utilities that belong to profes
sional organizations. These utilities tend to be larger and have greater
organizational capacity. Respondent data confirm that our sample is
heavily biased toward large facilities, with surveyed utilities indicating
that they are responsible for sewage treatment services to roughly 35%
of the sewer-connected US population (see Supplemental Information C
for a more detailed description of respondent characteristics). Because
of the low-overall response rate, however, other important biases may
exist in the sample population.

Table 1
Aspects of regulation, with descriptions and examples from the wastewater
sector.
Aspect

Description

Examples

Regulatory
requirements

Requirements established by
the CWA and associated
regulations or specified in
NPDES permits

Regulators and
relationships

Individual and institutional
characteristics of wastewater
regulators and their
relationships with the
regulated community

Regulatory
environment

The overarching regulatory
context within which
wastewater utilities operate,
encompassing regulation
under the CWA and other
federal, state, and local laws

� Effluent limitations and other
performance standards
� Monitoring and reporting
requirements
� Other specific requirements
in NPDES permits that
regulate treatment facility
operations
� Approach or “style” of
individual regulators or
institutions
� Regulator capacity (funding,
knowledge, etc.)
� Relationships and
communication between
regulators and wastewater
utility managers
� Regulation by multiple
regulators and/or regulatory
agencies
� Requirements associated with
multiple areas of regulation
(e.g., water quality, air
quality, activities that affect
endangered species, solid
waste disposal, land use)
� Uncertainty about future
regulatory requirements

“intra-institutional” relations (Baldwin et al., 2012), or simply an
“institutional matrix” (Kemp et al., 2000). The regulatory environment
may also encompass institutional stability and the costs created by un
certainty. In the wastewater utility context, we examine the interactions
between and among various sources of regulation, regulatory mecha
nisms, and agencies across multiple sectors and scales. We also examine
the impact of uncertainty about future regulatory requirements.
Table 1 summarizes these three aspects of regulation through the
lens of the municipal wastewater sector. Crucially, these aspects are
interrelated and influence one another, such as when relationships be
tween utility managers and regulators affect the content of regulatory
requirements. This framework—which may apply to other regulatory
contexts as well—contributes a way to consider, and to draw useful
distinctions between, several important aspects of regulation. It
informed the structure and content of our survey of wastewater utility
managers and informs our analysis below (Supplemental Information B).
4. Methods
4.1. Survey development and distribution
To examine perceptions of the relationship between innovation and
regulation in the municipal wastewater sector, we developed an online
survey and distributed it nationally to wastewater utility managers.3 The
survey targeted utility staff responsible for making decisions about
technology adoption at POTWs, usually with titles General Manager,
Chief Technical Officer, or similar. The survey began with a gating
question to ensure that those responding to the survey were appropriate
decision-makers within their organizations.
The survey asked respondents about their perceptions of the rela
tionship between regulation and the adoption of new technologies,
mostly using Likert-type questions with the option for open-ended

Table 2
Response rate from different survey distribution methods. Because duplicates
have been removed, the total number of utilities contacted is less than the sum of
the column.

Professional
organization
members
NPDES database email
list
NPDES database
mailing list
Total

3
A second survey with parallel question structure was distributed to regu
lators of wastewater utilities; the results of this survey and comparison between
the two surveyed populations will be discussed in a forthcoming paper.

4

Number of
utilities contacted

Number of
responses

Estimated
response rate

468

153

33%

2,684

97

4%

3,496

25

0.7%

5,137

275

5%
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Fig. 1. Respondent distribution by EPA region. The circled number shows the response count from the corresponding EPA region. The area of the circle is pro
portional to the quantity of responses.

respondents, 45%, indicated that regulation “sometimes discourages
and sometimes encourages” innovation. Smaller percentages of re
spondents fell on one side or the other of this question: 19% of
responding utility managers perceived regulation as “slightly” or
“strongly” encouraging innovation, while 25% indicated that regulation
“slightly” or “strongly” discourages innovation. This observation sug
gests that the situational context matters and validates the more gran
ular analysis that follows.

4.2. Survey analysis
Survey respondents were asked to score a list of 25 potential regu
latory barriers to innovation and 28 potential opportunities to
encourage innovation using a Likert-type scale from 1 to 5, with 1
representing “not a barrier” or “no encouragement” and 5 representing a
“very strong barrier” or “very strong encouragement” (Supplemental
Information B). We sorted individual Likert-type questions into Likertscale thematic question groups (Boone and Boone, 2012) that reflect
latent constructs revealed by the full set of survey questions. To arrive at
these thematic question groups, we used exploratory factor analyses, a
common survey analysis method that distills many related survey
questions into underlying explanatory factors (Fricker et al., 2012). The
factors analyses evaluated how responses to individual questions
co-vary with one another in order to identify latent constructs. By
definition, latent constructs are only observable indirectly, so we used
our professional judgement to assign descriptions to the constructs that
reflect the common content of the component questions (Table B-1;
Table B-2).
Barriers questions were sorted into seven thematic groups and op
portunity questions into eleven thematic groups. Each thematic question
group includes between one and four Likert-type questions (Supple
mental Information B). We further nested each of the question groups
within the three aspects of regulation described in Table 1 or an “Other:
Encouraging Pilot Projects” category that we include with potential
opportunities. For each thematic question group, we averaged the Likert
responses among the component questions to calculate a “barrier score”
or “opportunity score” that reflects the relative perceived influence of
the construct on innovation.

5.2. Regulatory barriers to innovation and opportunities to encourage
innovation
Utility mangers indicated that the strongest barriers to innovation
are found within regulatory relationships and the regulatory environ
ment. Interestingly, the impact of specific regulatory requirements on
innovation were seen as more moderate. Out of the seven thematic
question groups pertaining to potential barriers (Fig. 2), “uncertainty
about future regulations,” “regulatory approach,” and “regulatory ca
pacity” received the strongest responses. A pairwise statistical compar
ison of barrier scores suggests that these top three barriers are perceived
as similar in priority while “stringency of water quality regulations (too
strict)” and “complexities and inconsistencies” form a second tier of
similar priority barriers (Supplemental Information D).
When asked about potential opportunities to encourage innovation,
utility managers again emphasized the relational and contextual aspects
of regulation (Fig. 3). Their responses also suggested strong support for
opportunities to expand capacity and mitigate risk. Thematic question
groups related to specific regulatory requirements were again perceived
as less important than the other two aspects of regulation. Reducing
stringency of water quality regulations and increasing stringency of
water quality regulations were perceived as the lowest priority ways to
encourage innovation. A pairwise statistical comparison between op
portunity scores suggests that “increasing utility capacity and expanding
funding opportunities” and “reducing regulatory risk of pilot projects”
are perceived as having similarly high potential for encouraging the
adoption of new technologies. A second tier of similar priority oppor
tunities is composed of “improving collaboration between regulators
and utilities,” “addressing uncertainty about future regulations,” and
“addressing complexities and inconsistencies” (Supplemental Informa
tion D).
Above, we argued that regulation can be framed in a more nuanced

5. Results and discussion
5.1. Regulation and decisions about technology adoption
Results indicate that regulation is an important factor for utility
managers considering new technologies, but are ambiguous as to
whether regulation is a net incentive or a net barrier. 76% of wastewater
utility managers indicated that concerns about regulatory noncompliance are a strong or very strong influence on their willingness
to consider new technologies (4 or 5 Likert response). Despite the strong
consensus about regulation’s importance, a large plurality of
5
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Fig. 2. Perceived regulatory barriers to innovation. The bold vertical line indicates the mean barrier score for the thematic question group, with higher scores
indicating stronger perceived barriers; the width of the box illustrates one standard deviation.

Fig. 3. Perceived regulatory opportunities to encourage innovation. The bold vertical line indicates the mean opportunity score, with higher scores indicating
stronger perceived opportunities; the width of the box illustrates one standard deviation.

way. Our findings show that wastewater utility managers view regula
tion as a strong influence on technology decisions, but do not emphasize
regulatory stringency. Instead, utility managers highlight other aspects
of the regulatory process. This provides evidence in support of our
proposed conceptual model of regulation and demonstrates the need to
expand assumptions in both the academic literature and practical dis
cussions about how to understand various aspects of regulation (e.g.,
Brunel and Levinson, 2016).

5.3. Regulatory requirements
While regulatory requirements where not emphasized by utility
managers, understanding how utilities view these requirements can
provide insights on utility behavior in the non-market context. Survey
questions about regulatory requirements discussed particular terms and
parameters associated with the CWA and the NPDES permit system.
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5.3.1. Stringency of regulatory requirements
Utility managers in our survey did not indicate that they see reducing
stringency of water quality regulation as an important factor for
encouraging the use of new technology. While a considerable number of
utility managers described overly stringent regulations as a barrier
(Fig. 4, left side), it was perceived as only a moderate barrier compared
to others (Fig. 2). Moreover, respondents did not indicate that reducing
stringency of regulations would encourage innovation. In fact, of all
proposed opportunities to encourage innovation, “less stringent regu
lation of water quality” was the single lowest scoring question (Fig. 4,
right side), scoring lower than “more stringent regulation of water
quality” as a potential way to encourage innovation (see Fig. 3).
These moderate views on stringency affirm that utilities should not
be understood to behave like private firms under regulation. Under a
neoclassical economic model, private firms are generally understood to
be intent on limiting costs and, to that end, are expected to push for the
relaxation of regulatory standards (Gerard and Lave, 2005; Harford,
1978). Utilities may be motivated by efforts to keep rates low and thus
be similarly focused on costs. Instead, our finding is consistent with the
notion that public utilities have a broader set of considerations. In
particular, this may support the idea that utility managers are intrinsi
cally motivated agents (Dixit, 2002; Georgellis et al., 2010) that, as one
respondent put it, view themselves as “allies in protecting the environ
ment.” In the non-market context, however, this raises questions about
whether utilities might behave in a risk-averse, or other non-optimal
manner, that constrains the innovation process (Brown and Osborne,
2013; Lyon, 1990).
Open-ended survey data provided additional context for these views.
Respondents indicated that increased stringency can encourage the
adoption of new technology by mandating improved performance, but
this push is tempered by the realities of limited flexibility and resources.
In these cases, capacity forms a crucial barrier to innovation, pushing
utilities to select “older, proven technologies” that are more likely to
receive straightforward regulatory approval. Since effluent limitations
are based in part on the performance of conventional technologies,
limited utility capacity may further result in the under-exploration of
innovative alternatives.

5.3.2. Regulatory flexibility
Utility managers emphasized the opportunity to increase the flexi
bility of regulatory requirements rather than the relax their stringency.
58% of utility managers indicated that increased flexibility in how
effluent limitations are expressed in permits would strongly or very
strongly encourage the employment of new technology (4 or 5 Likert
response), compared to only 24% who gave the same response with
regard to reducing regulatory stringency.
In open-ended questions, survey respondents clarified that strict
“NPDES compliance schedules” and “rigidity in compliance standards”
may stand in the way of innovation. For example, utility managers
referenced how loading limits are expressed (instantaneous, daily,
weekly, monthly, etc.), with utility managers emphasizing that shorter
measurement intervals may create a greater risk of being non-compliant.
Several respondents also emphasized that innovative technical ap
proaches take time to become effective and that more relaxed ramp up
periods may be necessary to allow management strategies to adapt to
new processes. More rigid compliance schedules or shorter measure
ment intervals may or may not be demonstrably beneficial for aquatic
ecosystems, however, and allowing additional flexibility when public
health and ecosystems are not at risk may be an effective method for
encouraging the use of new technologies.
These perceptions raise potentially interesting arguments for
changing approaches to permitting. However, the extent to which
increasing flexibility in permit terms, parameters, and compliance
schedules is legal and consistent with CWA is well beyond the scope of
this paper, as is the evaluation of any tradeoffs inherent in the alter
ations of permit terms.
In addition to the above discussion of flexibility in permit terms,
respondents also see the lack of flexibility of regulators and agencies
themselves as a barrier. To describe the perceived flexibility or rigidity
�lez, 2009; Hem
in the regulators approach or “style” (del Río Gonza
melskamp et al., 2000), respondents used phrases such as “wonderful to
work with” or by contrast an “enforcer of rules instead of partners” to
describe the perceived flexibility or rigidity in the regulatory approach.
While related to flexibility of specific permit terms, the “lack of flexi
bility of regulators” elicited a much stronger response from utility

Fig. 4. Response distributions for questions about the extent to which overly stringent regulation is a barrier and how less stringent regulations would
encourage innovation.
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managers: 77% of utility managers indicated that the lack of flexibility
of regulators is a strong or very strong barrier to the adoption of new
technology (4 or 5 Likert response).
While flexibility of regulators was perceived as a strong barrier, op
portunities associated with the flexibility of specific regulatory tools eli
cited a more moderate response, especially as compared to other
proposed opportunities (see Fig. 3). Much of the literature on regulation
and innovation has emphasized the necessity of sufficiently flexible
regulatory instruments as a means toward promoting innovation (Ajami
et al., 2014; Ambec et al., 2013; Environmental Law Institute, 1998;
Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). Our survey of utility manager perceptions
supports this literature but adds a key nuance: the lack of flexibility of
regulators and regulatory agencies is perceived as distinct from, and
potentially more important, than flexibility as it relates to specific
NPDES permit requirements. This supports the notion that if regulatory
change intends to spur innovation, the concept of flexible regulation
should be extended so as to include both the capacity and behavior of
individual regulators and the approach of regulatory agencies (Freeman
and Farber, 2005). This also points to the broader importance and sig
nificance of relationships between regulators and the regulated
community.

and collaboration within and between communities of regulators and
utilities was unequivocally identified by utility managers as an impor
tant strategy to promote the use of new technologies.
5.5. Regulatory environment
The regulatory environment was also viewed as more important to
innovation than regulatory stringency and other specific regulatory re
quirements. In this section, we focus on complexities and inconsistencies
across various areas of regulation and examine uncertainty about future
regulations. We note that non-water quality regulations may be espe
cially relevant within the context of innovation, as many new technol
ogies emphasize resource recovery and multi-sector benefits.
5.5.1. Complexities and inconsistencies
Although utility managers perceive the context of navigating mul
tiple agencies’ requirements and regulations to be a barrier to the
adoption of new technologies (Fig. 2), no one area of regulation was
perceived as a particularly strong barrier. Fig. 5 shows utility manager
responses to questions about the extent to which various statutes and
corresponding regulations encourage or discourage the adoption of new
technologies—although not all utilities may be subject to each of these
areas of regulation.
Water quality regulations and water recycling regulation were
considered more of an incentive to adopt new technologies than a bar
rier, while Endangered Species Act regulations, land use regulations,
and general environmental review slightly discouraged utility consid
eration of new technologies on average (Supplemental Information B).
However, almost every one of these questions was met with a neutral
response by a plurality of utility mangers.
Because utility managers do not perceive any specific set of regula
tions to be a strong barrier, we conclude no single area of regulation
stands out as the primary barrier associated with the multiagency
context. Rather, utility managers may view the cumulative effect of
layers of regulation as the principle obstacle. This finding confirms that
of other studies that have identified the complexity of the multiagency
context as a challenge to the efficiency of environmental permitting
processes (e.g., Ulibarri et al., 2017). In order to address these barriers,
utility managers expressed considerable agreement that better coor
dination—both between agencies at local, state, and federal scales, and
between various sectors of regulation—would encourage innovation
(Supplemental Information B).

5.4. Regulators and relationships
Utility managers viewed the relationship between the regulator and
the regulated entity as one of the greatest potential opportunities to
encourage innovation. Yet, for regulators to engage effectively with
proponents of innovative technology they require considerable capacity
to evaluate the underlying science and engineering, and consider any
tradeoffs.
Wastewater managers recognize that regulators as individuals are an
important part of the regulatory process. But, crucially, they also
recognize the practical limitations regulators face as they evaluate the
potential applicability and unique needs of new technologies. Re
spondents identified regulator capacity (including funds, time, and staff)
and knowledge of unconventional technologies as among the strongest
barriers. In addition, communication and collaboration were recognized
as essential: 79% of respondents indicated that “improved communi
cation between regulators and utilities” would strongly or very strongly
encourage the adoption of new technology (4 or 5 Likert response).
Innovation has been described as a process led by an individual
decision-maker modulated by a complex market and information system
that includes regulation as a component (Kemp et al., 2000). Broadly,
we find support for this characterization of innovation, but also the
perspective that the regulator him or herself may be considered a second
essential decision-maker and collaborator within the innovation process
and network (e.g., Black, 2002; Sørensen and Torfing, 2011). This notion
was supported by the open-ended responses:

5.5.2. Uncertainty about future regulations
Uncertainty about future regulations was perceived as a top priority
barrier to innovation, and increasing regulatory certainty an opportu
nity to address this barrier. 73% of respondents indicated that uncer
tainty about future regulations was a strong or very strong barrier (4 or 5
Likert response), while just 9% of utility managers indicated that this
was a slight or non-barrier (1 or 2 Likert response). In open-ended
comments, survey respondents clarified that when utility managers
discuss uncertainty about future regulations, they are predominately
thinking about the lifespan of their capital investments and the potential
return on those investments. Indeed, a large percentage (73%) of re
spondents indicated that increasing certainty across 5-year permit cycles
to allow payoff of financial investment would strongly or very strongly
encourage the adoption of new technologies (4 or 5 Likert response).
Utility managers emphasized that changing discharge requirements in 5year intervals does not align with the need to make long term capital
investments, which often require multiple years of planning and con
struction with multi-decade infrastructure lifespans. As one respondent
explained:

It isn’t about regulation, it’s about developing relationships with the
person responsible for your permit and working through them to
achieve end goals.
In addition, utility managers identified other information networks
as important and effective ways to promote technology diffusion. Along
with utility-regulator collaboration, utilities recognized collaboration
amongst utilities (utility-utility collaboration) and collaboration
amongst regulators (regulator-regulator collaboration) as similarly high
priority opportunities to encourage innovation (see Supplemental In
formation B). Technology transfer efforts that expand information net
works among and between these groups, such as those emphasized by
EPA’s former Innovative and Alternative Wastewater Treatment pro
gram (EPA, 1989), may thus deserve revisiting.
While recent literature has highlighted that the potential benefits of
increased collaboration should be tempered by realities including
limited capacity (Porter and Birdi, 2018), improving communication

We are being encouraged by regulators to voluntarily construct ni
trogen reducing treatment processes, but we have no guidance on
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Fig. 5. Response distributions for the bipolar scale survey question: "To what extent do you think that each of the following areas of regulation encourages or
discourages the adoption of new technologies?"

what future limits will be, thereby risking either over-spending or
having to go back in the future and build additional treatment units.

highlighted concerns about the potential for citizen suits when trying
new technologies, which may result in utility liability even in a situation
where a regulator has elected not to pursue an enforcement action (e.g.,
Lund, 2000; Supplemental Information A). While utility managers ten
ded to agree that greater risk sharing by regulators would increase the
utilities’ willingness to run pilots, when and how such risk redistribution
would be appropriate and compliant with the CWA is outside the scope
of our analysis. That said, the perception of its benefits with regard to
running pilots was clearly conveyed.
Lastly, utility managers responded that technology verification and
certification programs would offer an opportunity to encourage the
adoption of new technology. One respondent simply requested that EPA
offer a list of emerging technologies that it recommends for various
applications on a periodic basis along with an explanation of why EPA
believes the technology could be beneficial. The expansion of these types
of programs may also be helpful to capacity-limited NPDES permit
writers (as discussed in Section 5.4), with the caveat that one size fits all
solutions or even plug and play technical approaches will be unusual for
wastewater treatment.

The respondent suggests that, while the regulators have provided
informal encouragement for the adoption of nutrient reduction pro
cesses, those are not a replacement for the certainty of formal standards.
Since the adoption of new technologies comes with its own set of risks,
further uncertainty about whether those technologies will meet future
regulatory requirements may discourage their adoption.
In open-ended comments, respondents repeatedly referred to regu
latory “assurances” as a potential way to address uncertainty about
future regulations. To the extent that these assurances imply advance
decisions about permits, they are likely to be legally untenable, although
an examination of their legality is outside the scope of this paper.
Additionally, as a practical matter, there are reasons the regulatory
context is not static. For example, future changes in receiving water
quality standards needed to protect water uses may necessitate changes
in effluent limitations or other NPDES permit terms in ways that regu
lators are not able to predict, or at liberty to speculate on. Nevertheless,
it is clear that utility managers view uncertainty as a strong barrier to
innovation and that one potential solution may lie in stronger working
relationships between utilities and regulators. More frequent and sub
stantive communications between regulators and utility managers could
help clarify regulators’ goals and thinking. While this will never result in
future regulatory certainty, it may be an opportunity to substantially
mitigate uncertainty. In effect, greater communication could function as
a qualitative risk sharing measure between the regulated and regulator
communities (see Section 5.4).

6. Conclusions
Regulation often describes a specific set of rules with which orga
nizations must comply. Past empirical attempts to test how regulation
affects innovation have relied on problematic attempts to measure the
stringency of those rules (Dechezlepr^
etre and Sato, 2017; Kemp and
Pontoglio, 2011). Our study contributes to a broader understanding of
regulation and suggests that future attempts to assess the relationship
between regulation and innovation, especially in the public sector,
should consider regulation as a multidimensional concept which en
compasses far more than regulatory stringency (Brunel and Levinson,
2016).
As we have discussed, regulation can alternatively be defined in a
relational way, focusing on the processes of communication and the
relationships between regulators and the regulated community (Black,
2002). Regulation can also describe the broader regulatory context that
includes multiple agencies and other institutional factors, termed the
regulatory environment or “institutional matrix” (Kemp et al., 2000).
This research details the distinctions between these three aspects of
regulation, with relevant findings for those seeking to encourage inno
vation in the wastewater treatment sector in particular, as well as for
scholarship on innovation and regulation more broadly.
While a plurality of wastewater utility managers emphasize that
regulation sometimes functions as a barrier to innovation, the survey
showed that utility managers do not identify specific regulatory re
quirements, and the stringency of those requirements, as the primary
obstacle in considering new technologies. Instead, utility managers

5.6. Encouraging pilot projects
Some of our survey questions related to opportunities to encourage
the use of pilot projects and did not fit well into our three aspects of
regulation (Table 1). Unsurprisingly, utility managers indicated that the
single best way to encourage the use of new technology is via additional
grants, loans, and other sources of funding for pilot projects. Given the
risk that utility managers face when attempting new technology
deployment, funding can help create protected spaces for innovation
(Kemp et al., 1998) and enable greater risk-taking among potential in
novators in the face of well-established incumbent technologies.
Along with increased funding, the reduction of regulatory risk was
also perceived as an important opportunity to encourage pilot projects.
Risk reduction may encompass a variety of mechanisms, and utility
managers emphasized in open-ended comments that leniency with
regards to enforcement would encourage pilot projects. Respondents
also mentioned the potential for the use of NPDES permit “variances as a
tool to promote innovation.” In this context, respondents additionally
9
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viewed barriers and opportunities related to relationships with regula
tors, as well as those related to the broader regulatory context, as more
important. Utility managers noted that taking steps to address un
certainties about future regulations and providing guidance through the
process of navigating complexities and inconsistencies may help to
encourage the adoption of new technologies. In addition, utility man
agers suggested that the regulator’s approach, communication, and ca
pacity were barriers to the adoption of new technologies, and that
improved communication, collaboration, and increased flexibility are
important opportunities to encourage innovation.
We stress that regulatory flexibility can take a variety of forms: in
particular, utility managers emphasized flexibility of the regulatory
approach taken by individual regulators and regulatory agencies. This
may imply that a utility manager’s perception of a regulator as an
“enforcer of rules” serves as a greater deterrent to innovation than an
effluent parameter’s specific compliance schedule. At the same time,
these negative perceptions about the regulatory approach or “style of
regulation” may be connected to specific legal requirements that cannot
be circumvented (Gerard and Lave, 2005).
In practical terms, our research suggests that encouraging innovation
can best be supported through the expansion of funding and capacity
support for both utilities and regulators. Increased capacity in both
communities could support more frequent and substantive interactions
between utility managers and regulators. Except to the extent that
funding is codified, our data do not suggest that legislative efforts to
amend the CWA and its affiliated regulations are an effective way to
encourage innovation.
Future research should more closely examine regional differences in
the perception of barriers and opportunities as well as consider the
unique challenges that may face small wastewater utilities. In addition,
future scholarship should more closely examine how regulatory re
lationships vary between local, state, and federal decision-makers as
well as within and among regulatory agencies responsible for different
areas of regulation. We also note that states and municipalities vary in
their fiscal environment and, while we did not collect detailed infor
mation about POTW funding sources, this may have a considerable
impact on investment decisions. Finally, we emphasize that open-ended
responses alluded to the rich potential for future case study research in
this sector, which has the potential to illuminate the ways in which
specific laws and regulations function to promote or stifle the adoption
of certain new technologies.
To conclude, we argue that incentivizing innovation is about more
than just the loosening or tightening of regulatory standards. Based on
these findings, we emphasize that regulation should be understood as
more than just the black-letter text contained in statutes and permit
requirements. To encourage innovation, regulation should be effectively
supported with resources, knowledge, capacity, and programs geared
towards supporting innovation and navigating the relational and
contextual barriers to taking risks. Such efforts will not follow auto
matically as the result of written regulatory rules, but rather will require
deliberate, thoughtful action and coordination by a range of decisionmakers and stakeholders from the regulated and regulator commu
nities alike.
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